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COMMENTS
REAL ESTATE LEASES-OPTIONS TO RENEW,
EXTEND, OR PURCHASE
INTRODUCTION
Real estate leases, containing options to renew, or extend the term, or to
purchase the premises often pose many vexing problems. It is the purpose
of the writer to consider a few of these problems. The subtopics each
treat a different aspect of the subject, and are related only in that the
problems presented therein arise in connection with options.
FIRST RIGHT OR FIRST PRIVILEGE TO RENEW
The numerical majority of courts as well as of cases indicate that the
option, right, or privilege is conditional and rests upon the willingness of
the lessor to lease the property again at the term expiration rather than to
sell it, to use it himself, to demolish buildings thereon, or otherwise to use
it in some manner inconsistent with a leasing of it.1
In a Massachusetts case, the lessee was given "the first right to re-lease
for a term of three more years at the expiration of the present lease, on the
same conditions and terms. ' 2 In holding that no absolute and unqualified
right to a renewal arose from these words, the court said the word first
should not be rejected as surplusage, but rather should be interpreted as
granting a preferential right to have a release at the option of the lessee in
the event the lessor at that time should desire to lease the property.3 While
the words contained in the leases vary somewhat in each case, this has been
the general construction given to such clauses when they have been the
cause of litigation. 4
There is, however, authority that such words create an absolute or un-
conditional right in the lessee to secure a new term. Called upon to con-
strue a "first privilege" of releasing, a Pennsylvania court said:
We feel that the words first privilege in this connection should not be so
construed as to nullify a valuable right in the hands of the lessee which ... was
1 Granting to Lessee of "First" Privilege or Right to Re-Lease or to Renewal or Ex-
tension of Tenancy Period as Conditioned upon Lessor's Willingness to Re-Lease,
6 A.L.R. 2d 820 (1949).
2 Cloverdale Co. v. Littlefield, 240 Mass. 129, 133 N.E. 565 (1921).
3 Ibid.
4 Laevin v. St. Vincent De Paul Soc. of Grand Rapids, 323 Mich. 607, 36 N.W. 2d 163
(1949); Buddenberg v. Welch, 97 Ind. App. 87, 185 N.E. 865 (1933); Fergen v. Lyons,
162 Wis. 131, 155 N.W. 935 (1916); Pearce v. Turner, 150 Ill. 116, 36 N.E. 962 (1894).
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evidently intended to be created. It was of no posible use to make provision
merely that one party should enjoy a certain right, if the other party should
consent thereto.,
FIRST PRIVILEGE TO PURCHASE
A provision in a lease of real property, granting to the lessee the "first"
right, privilege, or option to purchase the leased premises, or a substantially
similar provision, has generally been construed as conferring a merely
conditional option, dependent upon the lessor's subsequent decision or
offer to sell.6
In a recent Pennsylvania decision, the clause in question was, "[lit is
also agreed that the lessee shall have first option on buying the property at
six thousand dollars." In holding the option conditional on the lessor's de-
sire to sell, the court did not find that the statement of the price made the
option absolute.7
While in most cases the finding of the option to be conditional was
based upon a consideration of the option clause alone, many courts have
arrived at the same conclusion only after considering the lease as a whole
and the extrinsic circumstances."
Some courts have held the words "first privilege" to confer an absolute
right to purchase. In so doing, the word "first" has been explained away
as not being of controlling significance, when considered in the light of
the entire instrument.9
HOLDING OVER AS SUFFICIENT TO EXERCISE OPTION TO EXTEND OR RENEW
Practically all courts agree that a provision for extension as distin-
guished from a provision for renewal does not contemplate the execution
of a new lease contract; under such a provision mere holding over by the
lessee and continued payment of rent will suffice to continue the relation-
5 Stetler v. North Branch Transit Co., 258 Pa. 299, 301, 101 At. 980, 981 (1917). Ac-
cord: McDonald v. Karpeles, 61 Pa. Super. 496 (1915); Butt v. Maier & Zobelein Brew-
cry, 6 Cal. App. 581, 92 Pac. 652 (1907).
6 Wilson v. Singleton, 410 Ill. 611, 103 N.E. 2d 72 (1951); Falkenstein v. Popper, 81
Cal. App.-2d 131, 183 P. 2d 707 (1947); Nu-Way Serv. Stations v. Vandenberg Bros.
Oil Co., 283 Mich. 551, 278 N.W. 683 (1938); Sander v. Schwab, 315 Ill. 623, 146 N.E.
509 (1925); Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 111. 403, 37 N.E. 73 (1894).
7 Reichman v. Fisher, 60 Pa. D. & C. 673 (1947). Accord: R. I. Realty Co. v. Terrell,
254 N.Y. 121, 172 N.E. 262 (1930).
8 Stein v. Reising, 359 Mo. 804, 224 S.W. 2d 80 (1949); Hake v. Groff, 232 Mich. 233,
205 N.W. 145 (1925).
9 Langer v. Stegerwald Lumber Co., 259 Wis. 189, 47 N.W. 2d 734 (1951), rehearing
denied 262 Wis. 383, 55 N.W. 2d 389 (1952), rehearing denied 56 N.W. 2d 512 (1953);
Tantum v. Keller, 95 N.J. Eq. 466, 123 Atl. 299, aff'd 96 N.J. Eq. 672, 126 Atl. 925 (Ct.
Error & App., 1924); Barnhart v. Stem, 182 Wis. 197, 196 N.W. 245 (1923).
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ship of landlord and tenant for the full period of the extended term stipu-
lated for in the absence of indications of a contrary intention. 10 But
where the lease gives the privilege of a renewal, there is a split of author-
ity. Some courts say the tenant, by some affirmative act, must indicate his
election to avail himself of that privilege prior to the expiration of the
current term." According to the other view, mere holding over is suffi-
cient to render the lessee liable, on the one hand, for the full additional
time, and on the other hand is sufficient to give him full right to possession
for that period. 12
Wanous v. BalacoM presented a situation where a lease contained an op-
tion to purchase. The lessee held over, paid rent, and became a tenant
from year to year. While holding over, the lessee attempted to exercise the
purchase option. In refusing to compel a conveyance the court was of the
opinion that the option to purchase was not such a provision as would be
incorporated in a year to year tenancy created by operation of law.
WHAT CONSTITUTES NOTICE
Where the lease is silent as to the type of notice to be given the lessor,
the lessee must show that he gave a proper notice or made a proper re-
quest for renewal of the lease in a binding manner.1 4
It is quite generally recognized that where a lessee has a right of re-
newal provided he gives the lessor notice by a specified time that he in-
tends to exercise such privilege, the giving of the notice is a condition
precedent which must be complied with within the stipulated time, and
that in the absence of special circumstances warranting a court of equity
in granting relief, the right of renewal is lost if the notice is not given in
accordance with the provisions of the lease.' 5 It is apparently unnecessary
10 Straus v. Shaheen, Inc., 310 Mass. 646, 39 N.E. 2d 573 (1942); Gordon v. Tennant,
108 Ind. App. 326, 26 N.E. 2d 559 (1940); Blanck v. Kimland Realty Co., 122 Conn. 317,
189 Ad. 176 (1937); Anderson v. Dodsworth, 292 111. 335, 127 N.E. 43 (1920).
"Johnson v. Mary Oliver Candy Shops, Inc., 116 Conn. 86, 163 At. 606 (1933);
Linden Park Garage, Inc. v. Capitol Laundry Co., 284 Mass. 454, 187 N.E. 849 (1933);
Vincent v. Laurent, 165 Ill. App. 397 (1911); Thiebaud v. First Nat'l Bank of Vevay,
42 Ind. 212 (1873).
12 Sloan v. Longcope, 288 Pa. 196, 135 Ad. 717 (1927); Stout v. Tobias, 27 Ohio App.
113, 160 N.E. 874 (1927); Straus v. Robbin, 4 N.J. Misc. 631, 133 At. 868 (S. Ct., 1926);
Metzgar Register Co. v. Thomas Canning Co., 220 Mich. 435, 190 N.W. 245 (1922).
13412 111. 545, 107 N.E. 2d 791 (1952).
14 Gaggiano v. Gralloranzi, 26 Misc. 819, 57 N.Y.S. 2 (S. Ct., 1899).
15 Bickford v. Dillon, 321 Mass. 82, 71 N.E. 2d 611 (1947); Fuchs v. Peterson, 315 111.
370, 146 N.E. 556 (1925); Donovan Motor Car Co. v. Niles, 246 Mass. 106, 140 N.E. 304(1923); Beller v. Robinson, 50 Mich. 264, 15 N.W. 448 (1883); Thiebaud v. First Nat'l
Bank of Vevay, 42 Ind. 212 (1873).
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for the notice of renewal to embrace the terms of the renewal lease, unless
such is the necessary implication of the original lease.' 6
The decisions are in general agreement that where no method of notice
is specified, the notice need not be in writing, but may be oral. 1 7 The
reasoning upon which these decisions are based is that the lessee holds the
premises for the extension or renewal term under the original lease, and
not by virtue of the notice, and hence the writing of the lease satisfies the
Statute of Frauds.' 8
Many leases which contain options to extend or renew provide that
notice shall be in writing and served upon the lessor within a specified
time. Such provisions are generally construed to mean that mailing is per-
mitted, and the option is properly exercised if deposited in the mails on or
before the date due.19 An interesting situation was presented in Giordano
v. Zap,20 where the lease provided for notice of exercise of the option to
be given ninety days prior to expiration of the term. The court construed
this to mean personal notice. The lessee mailed his notice within the ninety
day period, but the lessor was out of the country one hundred thirty-five
days prior to the end of the term. In holding the option properly exer-
cised, the court said that the lessor could not have anticipated that the
lessee must discover the whereabouts of the lessor in Italy in order to give
him personal notice.
A recent Illinois case involved a lease which contained both an option to
renew and an option to purchase. The option to renew was admittedly
properly exercised. The court held that when the lease was renewed, all
provisions thereof, including the purchase option, were renewed. There-
fore, the purchase option continued during the renewal period.21 In Kleros
Bldg. Corp. v. Battaglia,22 there were two lessees. The lease provided,
"[1]essee(s) shall have option to renew this lease . . .provided they serve
notice ... on lessor," 23 and one of the lessees served notice. The court held
one of the lessees alone could not exercise the option.
16 Darling Shop of Birmingham, Inc. v. Nelson Realty Co., 262 Ala. 495, 79 So. 2d 792
(1954); Denny v. Jacobson, 243 Iowa 1383, 55 N.W. 2d 568 (1952); Stern Co. v. Fried-
man, 229 Mich. 623, 201 N.W. 961 (1925); Whitcomb v. Indianapolis Traction & Ter-
minal Co., 64 Ind. App. 605, 116 N.E. 444 (1917).
17 Dickinson v. Robinson, 272 Fed. 77 (C.A. 4th, 1921); Darling v. Hoban, 53 Mich.
599, 19 N.W. 545 (1884).
18 Ibid.
19 James v. Hutchinson, 211 S.W. 2d 507 (1948); Gorman v. General Outdoor Adver-
tising Co., 320 Il1. App. 339, 50 N.E. 2d 854 (1943); Baxter Laundries, Inc. v. Lucas,
43 Ohio App. 518, 183 N.E. 538 (1932); Case v. Fagin, 221 111. App. 209 (1921).
20 115 Misc. 619, 189 N.Y.S. 88 (S. Ct., 1921).
21 Hindu Incense Mfg. Co. v. MacKenzie, 403 I11. 390, 86 N.E. 2d 214 (1949).
22 348 Ill. App. 445, 109 N.E. 2d 221 (1952). 23 Ibid.
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An option to purchase was contained in the lease in Welsh v. Jakstas.24
The price was contained in the option and the lessee served notice of his
exercise on the lessor. Although some details were left to future agree-
ment, the lessor had an attorney draw a proposed sales contract and the
parties met to draft a contract. The court held that the conduct of the
lessor was consistent with an acceptance of the terms, and the option was
properly exercised.
DOCTRINE OF RELATION BACK
When the tenant exercises his option to purchase the property, it is said
that the relation of landlord and tenant ends and the relation of vendor
and purchaser is created. The lessor may not thereafter avoid his duty to
convey by declaring a forfeiture of the lease 25 and the lessee is no longer
liable for rent.26 In some cases the courts have applied the doctrine of
equitable conversion and held that the conversion relates back to the date
when the option was given, normally the date of the lease. So it has been
held that the lessee is entitled to an award made upon partial condemna-
tion of the property 27 and to insurance proceeds from a partial destruction
of a building on the premises,28 the event in each case occurring during
the term but prior to the exercise of the option. The English courts have
applied this relation back rule in determining who is entitled to the pro-
ceeds in the event the lessor dies after the execution of the lease and before
the option is exercised. A few states have followed the English rule. The
majority of American jurisdictions, however, refusing to apply the fiction
of relation back in this situation, give the proceeds to the lessor's heirs or
devisees, rather than to next of kin or legatees.2 9
The courts generally agree that when the optionee dies before the op-
tion is exercised, there is no relation back. 30 Therefore, when one of the
parties to the lease dies, the equitable conversion takes place at the date of
the exercise of the option and not at the date of the lease.
31
24401 M. 288, 82 N.E. 2d 53 (1948).
25 Jader v. Costello, 405 Ill. 181, 89 N.E. 2d 814 (1950).
26 Moore v. Maes, 214 S.C. 274, 52 S.E. 2d 204 (1949).
27 Cullen & Vaughn Co. v. Bender Co., 122 Ohio St. 82, 170 N.E. 633 (1930).
28 Schnee v. Elston, 299 Pa. 100, 149 Ad. 108 (1930).
29 Durepo v. May, 73 R.I. 71, 54 A. 2d 15 (1947); Ingraham v. Chandler, 179 Iowa 304,
161 N.W. 434 (1917); Smith v. Loewenstein, 50 Ohio St. 346, 34 N.E. 159 (1893).
8 0 Thommen v. Smith, 88 N.J. Eq. 476, 103 Ad. 25 (1918); Gustin v. Union School
Dist., 94 Mich. 502, 54 N.W. 156 (1893); Sutherland v. Parkins, 75 Ill. 338 (1874).
31 In re Bisbee's Estate, 177 Wis. 77, 187 N.W. 653 (922); Adams v. Peabody Coal
Co., 230 Ill. 469, 82 N.E. 645 (1907); Smith v. Loewenstein, 50 Ohio St. 346, 34 N.E. 159
(1893).
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OPTION TO PURCHASE-ASSIGNMENT
It is generally agreed that, absent a manifestly contrary intention of the
parties, upon a valid assignment of a lease containing an option to pur-
chase, the option, as a covenant running with the land, passes to the as-
signee and may be enforced by him in the same manner and to the same
extent as by the original lessee.32 But where the option clause provides for
the extension of credit to the optionee for at least a portion of the pur-
chase price, upon acceptance of the option, the option contemplates a rela-
tion of personal confidence between the lessor and the lessee and it is
therefore not assignable. 33 However, in Rosello v. Hayden,34 a lease con-
tained an option to purchase partly on credit and the court held that the
assignee of the lease could enforce the option upon offering to pay cash in
full.
CONCLUSION
It can be seen that in dealing with option clauses contained in real estate
leases, the courts apply rules of law only after considering (1) the lan-
guage of the option clause, (2) the lease in its entirety, (3) the intention
of the parties and (4) the extrinsic circumstances in each case.
Many of the problems which arise would be avoided or more easily
solved by more careful draftsmanship in order to manifest the intent of
the parties.
8 2 In re Frayser's Estate, 401 Ill. 364, 82 N.E. 2d 633 (1948); Keogh v. Peck, 316 Il1.
318, 147 N.E. 266 (1925).
38 Kritz v. Moon, 88 Ind. App. 5, 163 N.E. 112 (1928); Prichard v. Kimball, 190 Cal.
757, 214 Pac. 863 (1923); Menger v. Ward, 87 Tex. 622, 30 S.W. 853 (1895).
34 79 So. 2d 682 (Fla., 1955).
CHARITIES-RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN ILLINOIS, 1942-1957
Increasing interest has been focused on the law of charitable trusts. Per-
haps the most notable development has been in the field of tort immunity.'
In view of the immense public value of charities, problems such as "what
qualifies as a charity ' 2 and "how can charities be saved from invalidity"
are of great significance. Of course tax considerations which pervade all
fields of law are also a problem in charitable trusts. The following discus-
sion does not attempt to develop any particular aspect of charities but
rather to review the Illinois cases from 1942 to 1957.
' Charitable Institutions-Immunity from Tort Liability, 4 De Paul L. Rev. 56 (1954).
2 Professor Curran has discussed the question of whether a trust for masses qualifies
as a valid charity. Curran, Trust for Masses, 7 Notre Dame Lawyer 42 (1931); and
Curran, Charitable Trusts for Masses 1931-1956, 5 De Paul L. Rev. 246 (1956).
